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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
FAYE 'VALKER

OS~fUS,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

VB.

HARHY

7152

OS~IUS,

Defendant and .Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I.

Statement of the Case
This is an appeal from an order of the Honorable
J. Allan Crockett, one of the judges of the District Court
of Salt Lake County, holding the defendant in contempt
for failure to abide by a decree of this court for payment
of alimony and support money as provided in a decree
of divorce heretofore entered in the above entitled cause,
and also an• appeal from the order of th~ same judge
in the same cause refusing to grant defendant's petition
for modification of said decree.
On March 14, 1947, the plaintiff filed her complaint
asking for a decree of separate maintenance from the
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defendant, and asking for the custody of Colleen Osmus,
born December 22, 1940; Diane Osmus, born. July 24,
1942; and Darryl Osmus, born April 3, 1946; and praying.
for $350.00 per month alimony and maintenance money
for the children; and that summons thereupon issued.
(R. 1-4)
That on July 15, 1947, counsel for plaintiff and
counsel for defendant entered into a written stipulation
stipulating that the court make a temporary order granting to plaintiff· the sum of $100.00 per month as temporary support money for herself and children, to be paid
at the rate of $25.00 per week beginning on the date of
the order, and further ordering the defendant to pay to
plaintiff's attorney $50.00 on or before August 1, 1947.
(R. 7) That on July 15, 1947, the Honorable Roald A.
Hogenson signed an order pursuant to the above stipulation. (R. 6)
That on July 21, 1947, the defendant herein filed his
answer to plaintiff's complaint and a counterclaim
(termed "cross-complaint") wherein he asked for a
decree of divorce against the plaintiff. (R. 9-13) That
thereafter, to-wit, on the 29th day of August, 1947, the
plaintiff herein filed her reply to defendant's answer
and her answer to defendant's counterclaim. (R. 14-15)
That later, to-wit, on the 29th day of August, 1947, the
plaintiff herein filed an amended complaint asking for
a decree of separate maintenance and for the sum of
$350.00 as alimony and support money, together with attorney's fees. (R. 16-20)

That thereafter, to-wit, on the
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7th day of October, 1947, the plaintiff herein filed her
second amended complaint in the above action, wherein
she asked for a decree of divorce from the defendant, and
that she be awarded custody of the three minor children,
and the defendant to pay her $250.00 per month. ( R.
22-26) That on October 7, 1947, the entry of appearance
and waiver of the defendant was filed, which provide<l
that he entered his appearance in the case and consented
that his default be entered forthwith upon the condition
that the alimony and support money awarded should not
be more than the total amount of $250.00 per month.
That on the 7th day of October, 1947, the plaintiff
herein appeared before the Honorable J. Allan Crockett,
and the default of the defendant being entered by reason
of his appearance and waiver, the court heard the evidence and made its Findings of Fact, and among other
. things found as follows :
'' 4. The plaintiff and defendant formerly
resided at 1631 Kensington Avenue, Salt Lake
City, Utah, at which address a home was being
purchased on contract by and on behalf of this
plaintiff for the sum of $10,750.00. That approximately $1,200.00 had prior to February, 1947 been
paid upon said contract, but that since that date
the defendant failed to make the contract payments, that the contract became in arrears, that
plaintiff had no income from which to make the
payments on said contract, was threatened with
cancellation of said contract, and sold said home
and said contract and received for her equity' the
sum of approximately $5,000.00." (R. 29)
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"5. That the defendant is an able bodied
man of 39 years of age, is a capable manager of
eating establishments and has been over a long
period of time, through sharing profits in the
business, ·earning an average of at least $850.00
per month and is now capable of earning $500.00
per month.'' (R. 30)

' '7. That dfuring/ all iof the times ·herein
stated, this plaintiff has been a devoted wife and
1nother, and has spent her time exclusively in the
care of her family. That she has no other or independent income, but is entirely dependent upon
the defendant for the maintenance of herself and
children. That Colleen, the eldest child of plaintiff and defendant, is now and has been for some
time suffering from a rheumatic heart condition
requiring a great deal of care by this plaintiff.
'' 8. That this plaintiff has carefully calculated the necessary expenses for the o·peration
of the household of plaintiff and defendant, for
the care, feeding and clothing of herself and the
childre"u of phtintiff and defendant, and has determined that with strict economy $250.00 is the
least possible amount from which she could pay
said expenses. That this amount does not include
drugs, medicines, and medical care for the child,
Colleen, afflicted with rheumatic heart condition.''
(R. 31)
Thereupon, based upon the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the court entered its Judgment and
Decree of Divorce on the 7th day of October, 1947. That
in addition to providing for an interlocutory decree of
divorce for plaintiff, the decree provided:
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'' 2. That plaintiff have custody of the three
1ninor children of plaintiff and defendant, Colleen
Osn1us, Diane Osnn1~ and Darryl Osmus, with
right of defendant to visit said children at reasonable times.
"3. That plaintiff have and is h~reby
a warded the sum of $250.00 per month to be paid
to the plaintiff by the defendant as alimony and
support money for plaintiff and the children of
plaintiff and defendant, $100.00 as alimony to
plaintiff and $50.00 each to the children as support money, the first payment in said amount of
$250.00 to be made by defendant to plaintiff within
ten days from the entry of this decree.
"5. That this court retain jurisdiction of
this cause for all purposes which may to the court
seem proper in the interests of the children of the
plaintiff and defendant.'' (R. 33)
·
That on the 19th day of December, 1947, the plaintiff herein filed an affidavit setting out that on July 15,
1947, the above court had entered its order ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as temporary support money the
sum of $25.00 per week until further order of the court,
and to pay her attorney the sum of $50.00 as attorney's
fees, and further, on the 7th day of October, 1947, the
court entered its decree granting the plaintiff a divorce,
custody of the three minor children, and ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $250.00 per month as
support money and alimony for plaintiff, and alleging
that defendant had paid nothing except $50.00, leaving a
balance due and owing of $723.26. That said affidavit
alleged that defendant is an able-bodied man, steadily
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employed, and capable of complying with the order of
the court, and praying for an order directing defendant
to appear and show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of court, and why he should not pay the
plaintiff what was due her, and for additional attorney's
f·ees. (R. 39) That pursuant to said affidavit, the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, one of the judges of the above
entitl~d court, entered an order ordering defendant to
appear on Monday, the 22nd day of December, 1947, to
show cause why the court should not make its order herein punishing the defendant for contempt of court, and
why the defendant should not be compelled to pay plaintiff what was owing her, together with an attorney's
fee. (R. 37) That said order was duly served on the
defendant herein by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County.
(R. 41)
That on December 22, 1947, the defendant filed his
petition for modification of decree, wherein, he set forth
that he is now, and ever sin~e the decree was entered was,
actually earning less than $100.00 per month, and is incapable of earning in excess of $40.00 per week, and
was at the time the decree was entered earning less than
$100.00 per month, and has been earning less than $100.00
per month ~ince the 15th day of February, 1947. Defendant denied that he was in contempt of court, and affirmatively alleged that he had paid $50.00 to. the plaintiff since
the decree was entered, which was a sum far in excess of
his ability to pay from his earnings, but that said sum
was borrowed. Defendant also alleged that if he were
given four or five months respite from any payments, he
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would be able to make pay1nents to plaintiff of approximately $25.00 per week, but that it was impossible for
hiin at that tiine to make any payments whatsoever. (R.
42-43)

That on December 22, 1947, the parties hereto appeared before the Honorable J. Allan Crockett. Whereupon, plaintiff and defendant were sworn and examined,
and Theo Carlson was sworn and examined, and documentary proof was received in ·evi~ence, and the court
thereupon made his Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
'' 1. That on the 7th day of October 1947
the court made and entered its decree in the foregoing action, granting to the plaintiff a divo-rce
from the defendant; granting to the plaintiff the
care, custody and control of three minor children, issue of said marriage, and ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $250.00
per month as permanent alimony and as support
money for said children.

'' 2. That prior to the entry of said decree
and on or about the 15th day of July 1947, while
said action was pending, the court made and entered its order in said action requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the· sum of $25.00
per week, from said date, as temporary support
money pending said action and the sum of $50.00
attorney's fees for the use and benefit of her attorney therein.
'' 3. That the defendant has paid nothing
to the plaintiff under the terms of said decree or
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otherwise, or under the terms of the order of the
court for temporary support money and attorneys
fees, except the sum of $50.00, and that there is
due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant
under the terms of said order and decree of the
court the su~ of $723.26, no part of which has
been paid.
"4. That the award of $250.00 per month
payable to the plaintiff by the defendant by said
decree of divorce, was entered by the court pursuant to stipulation of the defendant, through his
attorneys, which stipulation is on file and of record herein.
'' 5. The court further finds frmn the evidence introduced that the defendant is and was
able-bodied, since the entry of the said order of
the court and the decree of the court herein referred to and has been and now is capable of
earning a sufficient amount to provide a substantial sum for the support of his former wife
and his children, and that his earnings in the
past has been as high as $800.00 per month as
a cook, and that he is still able, with a reasonable
effort to earn sufficient to comply with the terms
of said decree, but disregarding the order of the
court and decree herein, has wilfully failed to
do so, but instead thereof has wilfully failed and
neglected to find employment or seek ewployment or earn money with which to meet his obligations under said decree; that said defendant
has attempted to justify his failure to comply with
the order and decree of the court, .by testifying
that he is working for his board and room for a
1\f rs. Carlson, who has promised him an interest
in her business of operating a lunch stand which
the court finds is not a reasonable explanation
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of his failure to support his family and is a wilful
evasion of his obligations.
"6. That the plaintiff and her children are
dependent and have no income, except that supplied to them by the Salt Lake County Public
Welfare Department.
"7. That $25.00 is a reasonable attorney's
fee to allow plaintiff for the use and benefit of
her attorney herein.
'' 8. That the. defendant, by his evidence and
by his petition for modification of said decree has
shown no justifiable change of circumstances,
since the entry of said decree herein to justify
the court granting him any relief thereby.
''From the foregoing findings of fact the
court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"That the defendant by his wilful failure to
comply with the order and decree of the court is
guilty of contempt of court and should be punished
therefor.
''That the defendant is not entitled to any
relief by modification of the decree of the court
and the same should be denied." (R. 46-48)
and the court thereupon made its order as follows:
''IT FS THEREFORE 0 R DE RED
ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant be and he is hereby adjudged in contempt of
court for his wilful failure to comply with the
order and decree of the court heretofore entered
in said action and is hereby sentenced to be confined in the County Jail of :Salt Lake County for
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a period of twenty-five days commencing with the
26th day of December 1947.
''IT IS FURTHER 0 R D E R E D,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant pay to the plaintiff, until the furth~r order
of the court, one-half of his earnings, less proper
deductions, to apply on current and past obligations to the plaintiff under the order and decree
of the court, and that she have judgment for the
sum ·of $25.00 for the use and benefit of her attorney herein in these proceedings.
''IT IS FURTHER 0 R D E R E D,
·ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the petition
of defendant to modify the decree of divorce herein be and the same is hereby denied." (R. 49)
That thereafter, within the time required by law,
the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah from the order finding the defendant in
contempt and sentencing him to serve twenty-five days
in the county jail, and the order denying defendant's
petition for modification of decree.

Statement of Facts
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Kingman,
Arizona, on :March 20, 1940, and from that union three
children were born ; Colleen Osmus, born December 22,
1940; Diane Osmus, born July 24, 1942; Darryl Osmus,
born April3, 1946. (R. 1)
This marriage was not destined to last, and the
plaintiff on March 14, 1947, commenced the first of her
actions against the defendant-a suit for separate maintenance, set forth in the Statement of the Case, supra.
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On July 15, 1947, the parties entered into a stipulation
whereby the defendant agreed to pay to plaintiff $100.00
per n1onth as alimony and support money, payable
$25.00 per week, and the further sum of $50.00 for attorney's fees. J~dge Hogenson signed and filed such an
order on the 15th day of July, 1947. (R. 6)
The defendant did not comply with this order, and
only paUl $50.00 to the plaintiff some time in October,
1947. On August 29, 1947, plaintiff filed her amended
complaint, still praying for separate maintenance, wherein she prayed for $350.00 alimony and support money.
(R. 16-20) On October 7, 1947, plaintiff filed her second
amended complaint, wherein she prayed for'a divorce and
the sum of $250.00 per month, (R. 22-26) and on the
same day the appearance and waiver of the defendant
was filed (which was signed September 13, 1947), which
contained the provision "that the alimony and support
money to be awarded shall not be more than the total
amount of $250.00 per month." (R. 27) On October 7,
1947, the plaintiff was awarded a decree of divorce granting plaintiff $100.00 per month and $50.00 per month support money for each of the children, or a total of $250.00
per month. The decree made no provision for costs or
attorney's fees. (R. 33)
At the hearing before the Honorable J. Allan Crockett on December 22, ~ 1947, on plaintiff's order to show
cause and defendant's petition for modification, evidence
was adduced as follows: ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
The defendant, Harry Osmus, was and always had
been a fry cook, and that since the latter part of May,
1947, he has been· rooming with and working for Mrs.
Theo Carlson, who operates a restaurant at 6373 South
State Street, 'Salt Lake City, Utah, and that he was working for board and room, and that he had no interest in
the cafe whatsoever, and that he went to work for her
about May 16, 1947. (R. 55-57) That prior to that time,
that is, up, until February 15, 1947, he had worked for
a Mr. D. F. Anderson, who operated Dee's Hamburger
Stand in Salt Lake City, and that he earned around
$800.00 per month while working for Mr. Anderson, but
that his employment ceased with Mr. Anderson ·on February 15, 1947. (R. 57) That between February 15th
and May 16, 1947, the defendant had not worked at all.
That he went to Vernal, Utah, and stayed with his
brother for about five or six weeks, and he could not
find a job there. That he did not make an effort to get
a job as a fry cook in Salt Lake City because, if he started
working for wages, people that had .bills and judgments
·against him would garnishee his pay. (R. 58) That
d~fendant went to work for ~Irs. Carlson, and he was
eventually to get an interest in her business-in fact, a
one-half interest- when she got the place paid for, and
it was on a paying basis. That at that time she still owed
approximately $125.00 on the inventory. The defendant
was fry cook and did the cleaning up for Mrs. Carlson,
and in addition to board and room he got a few dollars
spending money, a total of less than $1.00 per day. That
Mrs. Carlson had bought him one suit since the divorce.
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The defendant testified that his attorney in the
original divorce (a different attorney than the writer)
adYised the defendant to sign a waiver and consent to the
$250.00 alimony, and that later they could go back into
court and cut the payments down to what he could pay.
That he was not in court at the time of the divorce. (R.
62)
Upon cross-examination Mr. Osmus testified that
Carlson had put up all of the money for the purchase of her cafe. That she had not been able to get her
investment out of it. (R. 62) That the defendant had
worked from 9:00 a.m. until 1.00 a.m. with the hope and
expectation of getting an interest in the business, and
hoped to build the business up so it would be more
profitable than working for wages. That at his job as
fry cook he could only earn $8.00 per day, and if he
joined the union, he would only work five days a week
and make a total of $40.00 per week, and he felt he could
do better by staying with Mrs. Carlson. and getting a
half interest in her business. (R. 64) Defendant was
also fearful that if he took a job he would be garnisheed
on account of the bills that were outstanding against
him, a,nd that all of these bills were contracted by the
plaintiff since her separation from him. (R. 63-64)
~Irs.

The defendant also injured his shoulder about the
7th of December and has been going to the doctor for
treatments and on account of his inj·ury is unable to help
Mrs. Carlson, and in fact, has spent most of the time in
bed. Defendant testified that he was further afraid that
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if he took a job his wages, would be garnisheed. The
judge at that time made some remarks that judgments
had been entered, and he wanted to know what the judgments were. Defendant asked the court if bills turn·ed
over to attorneys for collection were judgm·ents; whereupon, the court stated:
THE COURT: Let's not bother about giving
you a legal education. If you know what they are
tell us ; if you don'tDefendant then stated he owed the power company·
$19.00, the telephone company $30.00, Red Feather Oil
Company $80.00, a milk bill of $40.00, a. furniture bill of
$77.00, two doctor bills of $60.00 each, or a total of
$120.00, and a number of the bills had been placed with
the credit bureau for collection.
At the time th~ divorce decree was entered for $250.00
a month alimony, defendant was working at the same job
he was at the time of the hearing. (R. 66-67) At the
time of making $800.00 a month from Dee's Hamburger,
h~ was managing the place on a percentage basis, and
Mr. Anderson terminated that employment on the 15th
of FebruarJ_T, 1947, twenty-seven days prior to the commencement of the original action for separate maintenance.
In July, defendant offered to pay his wife $100.00
permo~tP. if she wo11ld consent to a divorce on that basis,
\>ut she said she would get $200.00 or know the reason
why, and .she would get ·every dime defendant ever made;
however, the stipulation and order of July 15, 1947, proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vided for $100.00 per month temporary alimony and suppOrt money.
The defendant knew that Mrs. Osmus sold the ·home
for $13,750.00 and there was around $8)400.00 due on it;
that she realized approximately $5,000.00.
Mrs. Osmus testified that she now lives at 2589 Elm
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, with her three· children,
·and that she is now living on the help of the Welfare.
That the three children were too young to be left alone,
and she was not able to leave them or to work, and she
had to stay with them. She testified that in November
the County Welfare Department gave her $80.00, and
in December $129.00, and that that covered her living
expenses, rent, and bills. (R. 75) That at the time of
the divorce she and her husband owned a very substantial
home, and that she sold the equity for $5,000.00, and that
she purchased a home in September aild paid $2,000.00
on it, and that the payments on the home are $55.43 a
month. That prior to the time she bought the home she
lived at the New Ute Hotel. That with· the aid of the Welfare she is able to make the payments on the home. (R.
76-78) Mrs. Osmus spent the $3,000.00 over and above
the down payment of the house during the four-month
period she lived in the New Ute Hotel, prior to moving
in her new home. She said she paid $5.00 per day for the
hotel room and $25.00 a week for someone to take care
of one of the small children. Part of the time she paid
her sister and part of the time to her sister-in-law, Mrs.
Reid Walker, for this work. The court thereupon obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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s·e~ved that the divorce was 'granted on the 7th day of
October, 1947, mid that the house was bought and all
the inone~; ·was spent by about the lst of September, 1947.
The court made the following observation :

THE COURT·: I have been talking all morn-ing about the fact that thl.s ·divorce was granted
on the 7th of October. From anything I now see,
the house was bought, all. the money was spent
by about the first of September, but if you can
show me some reason why this is material, I will
listen to it because we have ·had a good deal of
t~is back of the divorce. I thought we would try
to confine ourselves to the . matters that transpired since the ~ivorce happened. (R. 83-84)
Then again:
THE COURT: Fact - let's assume, even
from the tenor of your cross examination, she
was unwise and improvident about spending it,
which it would be my. judgment that spending
$3,000 in .four months' time would be lacking in
proper management, that wouldn't do you much
good if merely dissipated foolishly ..
MR. LANGLOIS:
some place.
A.

Unless show some hidden

There is no money hid any P'lace.

The Court: 'Vell, of course you are entitled to investigate that, if you wantto show that
she· has, or ought to have, some available to cover
this p·eriod since October 7 when Mr. Spence is
wanting the defendant held in contempt for not
paying. (R. 84)
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The plaintiff then testified she bought the childclothes, paid s01ne money to moving companies and
l'or ~torage. On questioning by the court, :Mrs. Osn1us
testified that she nwved in her new hon1e on the 15th of
September, and that she had sufficient n1oney after buying the h01ne to liYe on until she asked for welfare aid irt
November. ( R. 85) By "enough, she testified she meant
that she had about $200.00 left and she paid rent and bills
and the Family Service gave her $10.00 in October. That
she had a little girl that developed Perthes' diseas·e, and
that she had to wear a brace on her leg. ~Irs. Osmus testified she got $50.00 fron1 1\fr. Osnms in October. (R. 87)
ren·~

~irs.

Theo Carlson testified she operated a drive-in
cafe at 6373 South State Street, and that ever since the
defendant parted fron1 his wife he had worked for her.
She had not paid him any wages, but would give him
half interest if and when the place operated profitably
and she recovered her original investment. She stated
that for the past few months she had not made any
profit at all, that she had paid him spending money,
not exceeding $1.00 a day, and that she had given
him board and room. (R. 87-91) That there were profits
from the month of October of $149.50, and for November
$106.55, and that her food and the food for defendant
were taken frmn the business and treated as part of the
business operation. (R. 91) That the business was good
in June and July, 1947, and that the profits had run
$400.00 per month, but that the profits had been put back
in the business. That she expected the summer business
of 1948 to be very good. (R. 92-94)

a
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
The defendant makes the following assignments of
error:
I.

The court's Finding of Fact No. 5 was contrary to
and unsupported by the evidence, which finding reads
as follows:
'' The court further finds from the evidence
introduced ·that the def~ndant, is and was ablebodied, since the entry of the said order of· the
court and the decree of the court herein referred
to and. has been and now is~ capable of earning
a sufficient amount to provide a substantial sum
for the support of his former wife and his children, and that his earnings in the past has been as
high as $800~00 per month as a cook, and that he
is still able, with a reasonable effort to earn sufficient to comply with the terms of said decree,
but disregarding the order of the court and decree
herein, has wilfully failed to do so, but instead
thereof has wilfully failed and neglected to find
employment or seek employment or earn money
with which to meet his obligations under said decree; that said defendant has attempted to justify
his failure to comply with the order and decree of
the court, by testifying that he is working for his
board and room for a Mrs. Carlson, who has
promised him an interest in her business of op.:.
erating a lunch stand which the court finds is
_not a reasonable explanation of his failure to
support his family and is a wilful evasion of his
obligations.''
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II.
The court erred in its failure to make a finding that
defendant under the evidence was entitled to a Inodification of said decree in respect to the lowering of said
alimony and support nwney.

III.
The court erred in adjudging defendant in contempt
of c.ourt for defendant's failure to comply with the order
and decree of said court.

That the court erred in denying defendant's petition
for modification of the decree of divorc·e.

ARGUMENT
The defendant relies upon each of the assignments ·
of error above set forth, and will consider the assi~-.
Inents in the following arguments consisting of two different points :

POINT 1.
THE COURT'~ FINDING NO. 5 WAS CONTRARY TO AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED
IN ADJUDGING THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT
OF COURT FOR HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDER AND DECREE OF COURT. (Assignments Nos. 1 and 3.)
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The defendant was found in contempt for failure to
comply with Paragraph 3 of the decree of divorce entered on October 7, 1947, by the Honorable J. Allan
Crockett, which paragraph reads as follows:
"3. That plaintiff have and is hereby
awarded the sum of $250.00 per month to be paid
to the plaintiff by the defendant as alimony and
support money for plaintiff and the children of
plaintiff and defendant, $100.00 as alimony to
plaintiff and $50.00 each to the children as support money, the first payment in said amount of
$250.00 to be made by defendant to plaintiff within
ten days from the entry of this decree.'' (R. 33)
At the time of the hearing on December 22, 1947, the
defendant was in arrears the $250.00 paym·ents for Oc. tober, November and December, a total of $750.00. There
is absolutely no evidence in the record that during the
months of October, November and December he was able
or capable of paying any amount whatsoever on the
judgment.
The rule has been laid down in practically all jurisdictions that the inability of an alleged contemner, without fault on his part, to render obedience to an order or
decree of court is a good defense for disobedience of the
order or decre·e.
Note, 22 A.L.R. 1256
Note, 31 A.L.R. 649
Note, 40 A.L.R. 546
Note, 76 A.L.R. 390
Note, 120 A.L.R. '703
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In the case of Hillyard l'. District Oourt (1926), 68
Utah 220. 2-U) P. 806, Judge Gideon ~mid:
•·Under the authorities cited and the unifonn
holdings of the courb. it is prerequisite in eontempt proceedings of the nature here under revi~w
to an order conunitting to jail that the one charged
should be found able to comply with the court's
order, or that he had intentionally deprived hiln~elf of the ability to comply with such order."
Of course, the above authorities hold that an inability to pay alnnony brought about by the defendant's
o\vn acts for the purpose of avoiding it~ payment may be
punished for contempt, or, stating it in the way of American Jurisprudence, Vol. 17, page 510, section 671:
''In practically all jurisdictions it is held that
a husband who is unable to obey a decree for the
payment of alimony will not be adjudged in contempt for not obeying such decree unless he has
voluntarily created the disability for the purpose
of avoiding such payments.''
In the case of Watson v. JV;a.tson, 72 U. 218, 269 P.
( 2) 775, the lower court found:
"Defendant has earned sufficient wages to
pay said alimony but defendant has wilfully refused to pay said alimony and this court finds
that said defendant is in contempt of court for
wilfully refusing to pay said alimony.''
The finding was sustained by the evidence; however, the
court sentenced him to jail until he paid $600.00 delinquent alimony. The court did not find he had the
abilit~·

to pay $600.00. This court said:
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''To support such a judgment in contempt it
is clear that it should first appear that the act
sought to be coerced was yet within the power of
the person proceeded against to perform. It would
be repugnant to reason and futile to order a person imprisoned until he did some particular thing
unless he had the present ability to do it.''
In this case ·the defendant was a fry cook. The undisputed evidence shows that when working for wages
he would ·earn less than $200.00 per month. Like many
men, he was evidently dissatisfied with working for
wages, and some time during the married life of plaintiff and defe11dant he went to work on a commission basis
for Dee's Hamburgers, and there he made $800.00 per
month. How long he worked the record is silent, but he
evidently earned enough to obtain more than a $5,000.00
equity in a home. For some reason, on F·ebruary 15, 1947,
some twenty-seven days prior to the plaintiff commencing her original action of separate maintenance, he lost
his job. There is no evidence in the record that he left
Dee's Hamburgers in order to deprive his family of
support. He went to Vernal, looked for work and could
not find it. He came back to Salt Lake and associated
himself with Mrs. Theo Carlson's business. His wife had
the accumulation of their married life in her name-the
home. In April, 1947, she sold this and realized $5,000.00
for it, and he knew it. The defendant was not faced with
· a proposition of· accepting any low-paying job in order
to keep and feed his wife and children. He had reason to
believe and did believe that this $5,000.00 could keep them
until he got on his feet financially. When parties are
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111arried and living together, should the husband suffer
financial reverses, should he los.e a high-paying position
and be obliged to accept a lower one, then, of course, the
entire fmnily must rec.oncile then1selves to a lower standard of living and readjust their econ01uic. situation accordingly. Should the rule be different just because the~r
are separated'! It is a fact well known that once a man
has tasted the high wages and high living standards that
come with successful commission work or work for himself, he is loath indeed to go to work for wages. Many of
our fortunes in this city were based upon the fact that
son1e 1niner refused to work for wages, but starved
through an unproductive lease until he struck it rich.
The plaintiff in this case had $5,000, enough 1noney
to keep herself and children in decent living conditions
for over a year and until the def(mdant could rehabilitate
himself. On July 15, 1947, the plaintiff and defendant entered into their stipulation whereby he agreed to pay
$100.00 per 1nonth for the support and maintenance of
the minor children at the rate of $25.00 per week. At
that time the p-laintiff did ~ot seem to feel that she required $250.00 per n1onth. On October 7th the decree was
entered allowing $250.00 per month. The defendant stipu 7
lated to this.

Why~

you may ask. Every practicing at-

torney knows that case after case comes into his office
where one spouse is so anxious to get rid of the other that
he will sign any paper and agree to any conditions in
order to rid himself of his mate, and, of course, in this
case evidence was brought out at the hearing that the
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defendant was advised by his former attorney to sign
the stipulation, and that the amount would be cut down
to a reasonable figure at a later date. There is no record
in this appeal of what evidence was introduced at the
default hearing on October 7th. Suffice i~ to say that the
plaintiff knew that she had not received the $100.00 a
n1onth under the temporary order, and yet she asked for
$250.00 in the default case on October 7, 1947. The writer
wonders that had the lower court known on October 7,
1947, that the ,defendant had not paid the $100.00 per
month as ordered on July 15, 1947, whether or not he
would not have insisted on going into the financial ability of the defendant to pay $250.00 per month.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff demanded
and insisted upon ~he payment of either the $100.00 per
month under the July 15, 1947, order or the $250.00 per
month under the October 7, 1947, decree prior to December 22, 1947, hut that she came into court and asked
that this defendant he found in contempt.
The court in his Finding No. 5 did not find that the
defendant had earned enough to pay the $250.00 per
month as provided in· the decree, but he did make a.finding that defendant has been and now is capable of earning a sufficient amount to provide a substantial sum for
the support of his former wife and children, and that his
earnings in the past had been as high as $800.00 as cook,
and is still able with reasonable effort to earn sufficient
to comply with the terms of the decree. Where is the
evidence to substantiate that he could earn sufficient to
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cmnply with the dt:oeret> and pay $250.00 per n,1onth '? Did
the court feel that any fry cook at any time could get a
job. or rather, let u~ say, a positio_n, for $800.00 per
month? If that were possible, I believe that even the ranks
of the legal profession would become thinner on account
of their bec~n1ing fry cooks, and_ we might even lose a few
judge~. Of course, there wa8 no evidence to substantiate
such a finding, and the_ only question involved is whether
the defendant had wilfully placed hhnself in a position so
as not to comply with the terms of the decree of October
7, 1~)-l-7. There is absolutely no eYidence to substantiate
that.
The case of Seliph r. Selph (Sup. Ct. Arizona, 1925),
231 P. 921, on page 922, states:
''The law does not require impossibilities,
but it does exact good faith and an honest and
conscientious effort to perform its orders and decrees.''
On page 923:
''It has been held too that an inability to pay
alimony brought about by the defendant's own
act for the purpose· of avoiding its payment may
be punished for contempt.''
The case at bar is similar in one respect to Hall v.
Hall (Sup. Ct. Utah, March 3, 1947), 177 P. (2) 731F. - - . In that case i.t appears that the lower court found
the defendant in contempt for failure to pay alimony.
The parties had stipulated to $65.00 a month, and the
court arbitrarily raised the amount to $80.00 per month:
On the hearing for contempt, the court asked the defendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ant if he had been able to pay the $80.'00 per month, and
the defendant stated that he had not. The court arbitrarily stated that there was no doubt in his mind but that the
defendant could make these payments if he made up his
mind to do it.
In the case at bar, the court's findings were equally
arbitrary and were unsupported by the eVidence.
In W'ohlfort v. Wohlfort (Kans., 1924), 40 A.L.R.
538,225 P. 746~ on page 750, the court says:
''In such a case, when the court makes a
reasonable order, the amount of which the husband can pay out of his property or out of his
earnings, the court has the power to commit him
to jail for contempt if he willfully refuses to do
so. But an order committing to jail is the exercise
of the ultimate power of a court of equity, and
the prudent chancellor is careful that there be no
mistake in its use. It should be used only when
it is clear (1) that the original order is reasonable, (2) that the husband is able to comply with
it ·without undue hardship, and (3) that his refusal to comply with it is willful to such a degree
as to be contumacious, amounting to contemptuous
disobedience. When this situation is made clear,
then the chancellor not only has the power, but it
becomes his duty, to issue the commitment.''
The defendant contends in the case at bar (1) that
the original order in this case of $250.00 per month was
unreasonable; (2) that the defendant was unable to comply with it at all; (3) that his refusal was not wilful at
all and was not contumacious or contemptuous disobedience.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lt n1ust be borne in 1nind in this case that the order
made after the hearing on Decernber 22, 1947, was the
first an(l only order to be made. The defendant could not
complain of that portion o~ the order wherein he was to
pay one-half of what he 1nade after certain deductions.
~nch an order has been upheld in the case of Wohlfiort z:.
TVohlfort, supra.
As to whether or not the court could have ordered
the defendant to go and seek work ~t a place other than
~Irs. Carlson's is in dispute with the authorities. In the
case of Nl esservy v. M esservy, 67 SE 130, 30 LRAns 1001,
the court held that it could not compel a husband who
has no trade or profession or employment, to learn a
trade, acquire a profession, or find employment, and, by
exercise thereof, derive an income, to comply with the
court's order to pay alimony to his wife, in a suit for her
separate maintenance.
A contrary view is found in Fowler v. Fowl~r, 61
Okla. 280, 161 P. 227, LRA 1917C 89, which holds a man
who has no money or tangible property may be adjudged
in conten1pt of court in failing to pay alimony adjudged
to be paid by him if he makes no honest effort, cQnsidering hi~ 1nental and physical capabilities to work and earn
woney to pay the same.
The case of Andr:ews v. McM~ahan (New Mexico,
1938), 85 P. (2) 743, held that the district court erred in
committing an unemployed, divorced husband for con..:
tempt in failing to pay his former wife the sums awarded
h~· the divorce decree for the support of the minor child
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and attorney's fees in the absence of a finding that he
could find employment or had the· pecuniary ability to
pay the judgment, although the court found that he had
the ability and strength to do certain kinds of work.
There was absolutely no evidence that the defendant
Os1nus could find employment at $800.00 a month, or in
any sum exceeding $40.00 per week, and owing to the
fact tha~ the plaintiff had $5,000.00, there was no reason
why the defendant should accept a job at $40.00.per week,
which, if he turned over all of his wages to his wife,
would still fall short of the amount ordered to be paid
under the October 7, i947, decree.
The defendant contends that the evidence wholly
fails to substantiate the findings of the court in regard
to his ability to pay and his ability to obtain work, and,
therefore, it necessarily follows tha·t the order of the
court finding the defendant in. contempt was wholly erroneous.
POINT 2
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO
MODIFY THE DECREE OF OCTOBER 7, 1947, IN
RESPECT TO ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY.
(Assignments Nos. 2 and 4.)
The courts in Utah have held that to entitle a party
to a modification of decree there must he a change in
circumstances.
Chaffee v. Chaffie,e, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76; Car.
son v. Carson, 87 U. 1, 47 P (2) 894; Oo,dy v.
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Cody, -!7 U. -!56, 467, 15-! P. ~)52; Rockwood v.
Roclmvood, 65 U. 261, 236 P. 457.

In this case the decree had not become final. It was
entered on October I, 1947, and it was still in its interlocutory stage, and the court on its own motion may
nwdify an interlocutory decree at any time before it
becmnes final, and when that is done, time for appeal
comn1ences to run from the date of entry of the new or
1nodified decree.

Salt Lake· City v. Industrial Commission,
s2 r. 179,22 P. (2) 1046.
This court has held, in the case of Anderrson v. Anders·on, - - U. - - , 172 P. (2) 132, the criterion for determination of support money is the need of the person
supported and the defendant's ability to pay.
The proper procedure for the party who is unable
to comply with the order for payment of alimony or· support of minor children is to seek a modification of the
order, not to resist its enforcement, -thereby subjecting
himself to contempt proceedings.
Bailey

'L

81(;perior Court (Calif., 1932) 11

P. (2) 865.

In the case at bar there are, of course, no changed
conditions. The defendant was utterly unable to pay
$250.00 per month on October 7, 1947, and his condition
had not changed on December 22, 1947, when he was in
court on his petition or application for modification. The
lower court had its attention called to the fact that the
dPeree of October 7, 1947, was excessive, ,that the defend-
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ant could not possibly comply with its provisions. The
court could, and should at that time, have modified the
alimony and support money provision in the decree. As
it is, the $250.00 per month, or that part of it that the
defendant is unable to pay, is pyramiding each and every
rnonth, and, unless the defendant, by some miracle, obtains a large sum of money to pay off the judgment, he
will have a financial millstone around his neck that will
forev~r discourage him from working. The court did, in
his order in the hearing of December 22, 1947, order the
defendant to pay one-half of his earnings, less proper deductions, to apply on current and past obligations to the
defendant; however, this order did not alter the $250.00
per month provision in the decree.
The excessive demands of plaintiff were certainly
not based upon the defendant's ability to pay, bu·t appear rather to have stemmed from her desire for vengeance or revenge on account of his association with another woman. The court should have modified the decree, taking into consideration the needs of the plaintiff and the ability to pay of the defendant. Unfortunately, in all 'of these cases t~e needs must always yield to
the ability to pay. In almost every divorce, unless the
parties are rich, there is some economic maladjustment,
and both parties must bear this together. If the decree of
October 7, 1947, had made a ridiculously small allotment
of alimony and support money, say $5.00 to each person,
then, of course, within the six months' period the plaintiff· could have mo~ed ~to have the decree modified and
corrected, and so it necessarily follows that in this case
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the eourt could and should have granted the defendant
~ome relief.

CONCLUSION
ln conclusion, the defendant contends that there was
ab~olutely no evidence brought forth at the hearing that
he in any way had the ability between October 7, 1947,
and Dece1nber 22. 1947, to pay the defendant the $250.00
per month as provided in the divorce decree, and the
defendant further contends that there was absolutely ,no
eYidence that he had by his OWll acts brought about his
inability to pay the alimony and support money for the
purpose of avoiding its payment, and that therefore the
court's holding hiln in contempt should be set aside and
the court's ruling reversed.
Defendant further contends that payment of $250.00
support money and alimony for a man in his circumstances and earning ability at this time is so excessive
that the court's action in denying his applicatio:t]. for
modification was absolute error, and that this court
should on its own motion reduce said amount or should
remand the case for further testimony before the district
court in order that the lower court can make an order
based upon the plaintiff's needs and the defendant's
ability to pay.
Respectfully submitted,
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